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I. INTRODUCTION
On 12 May 2008, the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Dep
SECDEF) issued a formal definition of cyberspace via a memorandum
to the secretaries of the military departments and the rest of the
Department of Defense (DOD).' Implicit in this memorandum was a
statement of the importance of cyberspace to military operations.
Specifically, the Dep SECDEF noted that combatant commands and
other defense components require "the ability to operate unhindered in
cyberspace." 2 Thus, it is now doctrinally accepted, without any,
exception within the DOD, that cyberspace is a "war-fighting domain. '
However, cyberspace is a domain not only used by war-fighters
(indeed warfighters are a miniscule minority of users), it is accessed by
a significant and growing global population for business
1 Memorandum from Deputy Secretary of Defense to Secretaries of the Military
Departments et al., subject: The Definition of "Cyberspace" (12 May 2008) [hereinafter
Dep SECDEF Memo]. The memorandum defines cyberspace as: "A global domain
within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of
information technology infrastructures, including the internet, telecommunications
networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers." Id.; see also
U.S. DEP'T OF DEF. JOINT PUB. 1-02, DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS,
141 (12 Apr. 2001, as amended through 17 Mar. 2009). This definition is bolstered in
part by U.S. DEP'T OF DEF. DiR. 8320.02, DATA SHARING IN A NET CENTRIC
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE para. 4.1 (23 Apr. 2007) [hereinafter DODD 8320.02], which
states, "Data is an essential enabler of network-centric warfare (NCW) and shall be
made visible, accessible, and understandable to any potential user in the Department of
Defense as early as possible in the life cycle to support mission objectives."
2 Dep SECDEF Memo, supra note 1.
3 See, e.g., Lieutenant General Keith Alexander, Warfighting in Cyberspace, 46 JOINT
FORCE Q. 58, 58-61 (3d Quarter 2007); General James E. Cartwright, USSTRATCOM, a
Command for the 21st Century, 42 JOINT FORCE Q. 71 (3d Quarter 2006); JOINT CHIEFS
OF STAFF, JOINT PuB. 3-11, JOINT OPERATIONS, at 111-22 (13 Feb. 2008) [hereinafter JP 3-
11]; JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PuB. 3-13 INFORMATION OPERATIONS, at 1-4 (13 Feb.
2006) [hereinafter JP 3-13]. A facet of cyberspace as a warfighting domain was already
accepted in terms of net-centric warfare (NCW). See, e.g., DODD 8320.02, supra note
1, at E 1.1.18 which defines NCW as:
An information superiority-enabled concept of operations that
generates increased combat power by networking sensors, decision
makers, and shooters to achieve shared awareness, increased speed
of command, higher tempo of operations, greater lethality, increased
survivability, and a degree of self-synchronization. In essence, NCW
translates information superiority into combat power by effectively
linking knowledgeable entities in the battlespace.
Also note, in the 2004 National Military Strategy for the United States, the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted "the Armed Forces must have the ability to operate across
the air, land, sea, space and cyberspace domains of the battlespace." CHAIRMAN OF THE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES 18
(unclassified version, 2004) [hereinafter NAT'L MIL. STRATEGY].
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communications, personal recreation, intelligence collection, and a host
of other uses. 4 Commensurately, cyberspace is a crowded domain, and
for the warfighter, access to it requires cleared pipelines, in turn
necessitating a minimization of unofficial Internet access. The DOD
does not own cyberspace, or even a portion of it, in a traditional legal
sense.5  But, the DOD is able to perform functions in parts of
cyberspace by creating security measures which control access to those
areas. 6 The area of operations controlled by the DOD is referred to as
the Global Information Grid (GIG).7 Without access to the GIG, or the
ability to protect the flow of information (or freedom of maneuver) on
it, the military's capabilities are severely degraded.8
It is axiomatic that the success or failure of military operations
in cyberspace is contingent on access to cyberspace. While much of the
focus on the military's use of cyberspace is on offensive or defensive
roles, attention to the management of access to cyberspace is equally
important. This is because without proper management, neither the full
4 U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., THE NATIONAL STRATEGY TO SECURE CYBERSPACE,
(February 2003) [hereinafter NATIONAL CYBERSPACE STRATEGY]. This article's
argument comports with the third of five priorities set out in the Strategy, to raise
national cybersecuity awareness.
5 Two articles containing an impressive holistic discussion of cyberspace as a commons
rather than a property are: Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the
Digital Anticommons, 91 CAL, L. REV. 439 (2003); Jonathan J. Rusch, Cyberspace and
the "Devil's Hatband," 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 577 (2000).
6 See, e.g., Gregory F. Intoccia & Joe Wesley Moore, Communications Technology,
Warfare, and the Law: Is the Network A Weapon System?, 28 Hous. J. INT'L L. 467
(2006); Davis Brown, A Proposal for an International Convention To Regulate the Use
of Information Systems in Armed Conflict, 47 HARV. INT'L L.J. 179 (2006); Ruth G.
Wedgwood, Proportionality, Cyberwar, and the Law of War, 76 INT'L L. STUD. 219, 222
(2002); DOROTHY E. DENNING, INFORMATION WARFARE AND SECURITY 65 (1999).
7 U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., DIR 8100.01, GLOBAL INFORMATION GRID, OVERARCHING POLICY
para. E.2.1.1 (Sept. 19, 2002; certified current Nov. 21, 2003) [hereinafter DODD
8100.00], defines cyberspace as, the notional environment in which digitized
information is communicated over computer networks. The DOD portion of cyberspace
is referred to as the Global Information Grid, or "GIG." DODD 8100.01 defines the
GIG as:
The globally interconnected, end-to-end set of information
capabilities, associated processes, and personnel for collecting,
processing, storing, disseminating, and managing information on
demand to warfighters, policy makers, and support personnel. The
GIG includes owned and leased communications and computing
systems and services, software (including applications), data,
security services, other associated services necessary to achieve
Information Superiority.
8 See, e.g., Vida M. Antolin-Jenkins, Defining the Parameters of Cyberwar Operations:
Lookingfor Law in All the Wrong Places?, 51 NAVAL L. REV. 132,132-133 (2005).
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range of offensive, defensive, or exploitive operations will occur. 9
However, the DOD is currently lacking sufficient regulatory authority to
ensure the availability of access to conduct operations through
cyberspace, because the conduct of its members is predicated on a
number of false assumptions which are written into outdated or
otherwise poorly designed current regulations. This article addresses
those assumptions and existing regulations and argues for new guidance
to alter the current paradigm of almost unfettered access.
This article is divided into three sections. Section I touches on
the nature of DOD cyberspace and the potential harms that result from
current social behaviors of the department's personnel. Section II
analyzes shortcomings in existing regulations to police the use of
government information systems. Section III presents differing options
to provide the DOD and its commanders a means to reduce the risk of
malicious code through the implementation of a new regulation or
lawful order. It also includes an analysis of relevant supportive federal
and state court decisions. Finally, the article contains an appendix with
a draft proposed regulation and a draft order. One issue throughout this
article is important to note. The article and its contents are unclassified,
but much of the information on cyber-intrusions, defense methods in the
networks, and the forensic work on malicious codes are classified secret
and top-secret. Consequently, the article relies on open source
documents, which do not contain detailed information on the tactics,
techniques, and procedures or adversary conduct in cyberspace.
II. THE NATURE OF DOD CYBERSPACE: CURRENT
ASSUMPTIONS AND DANGERS
There are five essential considerations which require continual
understanding throughout this article, and indeed, in addressing the need
to change the paradigm of almost unfettered access. The first is social
behavior, which is the sole focus of this article. Most users believe that
access to the internet is of only nominal cost, which results in its
9 Offensive actions fall under the rubric of Computer Network Attack (CNA) which is
doctrinally defined as "actions taken through the use of computer networks to disrupt,
deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or
the computers and networks themselves." JP 3-13, supra note 3, at 11-5. Defensive
actions fall under the rubric of computer network defense (CND) which is doctrinally
defined as "actions taken . . . to protect, monitor, analyze, detect, and respond to
unauthorized activity within the Department of Defense information systems and
computer networks." Id. Intelligence and other activities on the network, such as
operations preparation of the battlespace, generally fall under the rubric of computer
network exploitation (CNE). Id. CNE is defined as enabling operations and intelligence
collection capabilities conducted through the use of computer networks to gather data
from target or adversary automated information systems or networks. Id.
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unfettered use.' ° This assumption is false. In fiscal year 2007, the DOD
through the Defense Information Services Agency procured Internet
access at an annual recurring cost in excess of $105 million." In July
2008, a naive e-mail user in the DOD sent out an e-mail containing an
Internet game attachment. The resulting e-mails and other net activity
caused a widespread disruption across the base's server. 12
Despite the expenditure of monies, freedom of access to the
internet has also translated into the idea that the DOD or its component
services will block offending or dangerous sites. Problematic to this
assumption is that many otherwise legitimate sites unwittingly contain
malicious code, and other sites are spoofed to enable exfiltration of
critical data. 13 The National Institute of Standards and Technologies
(NIST), a division of the Department of Commerce, states the problem
as this: "In the 1980s, malware was occasionally a nuisance or
inconvenience to individuals and organizations; today, malware is the
most significant external threat to most systems, causing widespread
damage and disruption and necessitating extensive recovery efforts
within most organizations.'
' 4
10 See, e,g,, Nick Wingfield, The Rise and Fall of Web Shopping at Work, WALL STREET
J., Sep. 27, 2002, at Bi; Charging By the Byte, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2008, at C2
(discussion of bandwidth costs); Michael W. Carroll, Open Access Publishing and the
Future of Legal Scholarship: The Movementfor Open Access Law, 10 LEwIS & CLARK
L. REV. 741 (2006) (arguing for freedom of access to both primary secondary legal
materials).
1 1 DEF. INFO. SERVICES AGENCY ANNUAL BUDGET REVIEW (2007) (on file with author
and DISA).
12 Colonel Peter Marsksteiner, The Threat from Within: E-Mail Overload Degrades
Military Decision Making, ARMED FORCES J., Sept. 2008, at 32, available at
http://www.armedforcesjoumal.com/2008/09/3640424/.
13 NATIONAL CYBERSPACE STRATEGY, supra note 4, at 6; see also, ROBERT H. ANDERSON
ET AL., RAND MONOGRAPH REPORT: SECURING THE U.S. DEFENSE INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE 17-45 (2007). For a discussion on spoofing, see Marc M. Harrold,
Prosecution Responses to Internet Victimization: Panel Discussion 111, Working with
Corporations on Case Investigations, 76 Miss. L. J. 875 (2007).
14 NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., SPECIAL PUB. 800-83, GUIDE TO MALWARE
INCIDENT PREVENTION AND HANDLING 2-1 (Nov. 2005) [hereinafter NIST SP 800-83].
NIST recommendations are not binding on government agencies, and in particular,
national security systems are exempt from NIST directives.
Organizations should plan and implement an approach to malware
incident prevention based on the attack vectors that are most likely
to be used, both currently and in the near future. Because the
effectiveness of prevention techniques may vary depending on the
environment (i.e., a technique that works well in a managed
environment might be ineffective in a non-managed environment),
organizations should choose preventive methods that are well-suited
to their environment and systems. An organization's approach to
malware incident prevention should incorporate policy
considerations, awareness programs for users and information
technology (IT) staff, and vulnerability and threat mitigation efforts.
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Moreover, while it is true technologies exist to block access to
specific websites, it is also true that technologies exist to bypass those
web-blocks, and as such, have already been employed by service-
members and other DOD personnel. 15 While accessing Internet sites
from DOD computers posses only one risk to malicious code, it is the
most difficult to prohibit. 16 For instance, it is likely easier to prevent the
transfer of information from a personal computer via a personal thumb-
drive or other removable media to a DOD computer than it is to prohibit
access to sites which are not currently blocked. In response to the
appearance of malicious code on government information systems of
various classification levels, the DOD enacted a ban on the use of
certain removable media. 17 At best, technological solutions alone
deprive the DOD of the full "defense in depth" that it requires to protect
its cyber capabilities or critical information.
The second consideration is that risks such as malicious code
occur as a function of access and connection, rather than actual time
spent on an Internet site. 18 The time to download a malicious code is
often measured in nanoseconds, making it virtually instantaneous. 19
Malicious code resides primarily across the Internet, but some malicious
code has been designed to traverse onto computer systems with high
classification levels that do not connect to the Internet.20 Gaps, known
colloquially as "air gaps," existing between isolated classified system
networks and unclassified systems connecting to the Internet were
thought to serve as a protective barrier against intrusions onto the
Id., at 3-17; see, e.g., Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA),
44 U.S.C. §§ 3541-49 (2006).
15 A good discussion of this problem in found in NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH.,
SPECIAL PUB. 800-28-v2, GUIDELINES ON ACTIVE CONTENT AND MOBILE CODE 3-3 (Mar.
2005) [hereinafter NIST SP 800-28-v2].
16 NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., SPECIAL PUB. 800-53-r2, RECOMMENDED
SECURITY CONTROLS FOR GOVERNMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS B-6 (Dec. 2007) defines
malicious code as software or firmware intended to perform an unauthorized process
that will have an adverse impact on the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of an
information system, such as a virus, worm, Trojan Horse, or other code-based entity that
infects a host. Spyware and some forms of adware are also examples of malicious code.
17 See, e.g., William H. McMichael & Bruce Rolfsen, Despite Network Virus-Avoid
Thumb Drives, A.F. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2008, at 13.
18 NIST SP 800-28-v2, supra note 15, at 3-1); see also 3 HOSSEIN BIDGOLI,
INFORMATION SECURITY: THREATS, VULNERABILITIES, PREVENTION, DETECTION, AND
MANAGEMENT 44-45 (2006).
19 See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1003,
1023-26 (2001). A good discussion on the subject of malicious code is also found in
State v. Corcoran, 522 N.W.2d 226 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994).
20 See, e.g., Lolita C. Baldor, Associated Press, Pentagon Bans Computer Flash Drives,
THE SUNDAY OREGONIAN, Nov. 23, 2008, at A3.
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classified systems. 2' But, information on the classified systems as well
as the systems themselves may be in jeopardy by both the lawful
transference of information, as well as the negligent transference of
information between the classified levels.22 As a result, this article is
not concerned with the ethical implications of time spent in web-surfing
from government information systems during duty hours, but the web-
surfing itself.
The third consideration is what the reduction in unofficial
Internet access traffic will give commanders overseeing military
operations. United States military operations rely on decisional
superiority, freedom of maneuver, and operational security. 23 Because
of excessive unofficial Internet usage, the DOD decided to purchase
commercial Internet service in the U.S. Central Command area of
responsibility. The reduction in unofficial Internet access traffic will
protect these essential operational requirements by reducing the risk to
the GIG.
Fourth, the exponential growth of malicious code risks to
secured information on the GIG, the ability for the DOD to freely access
the GIG, and the integrity of secured information on the GIG are all part
of the same concern: GIG security. While no regulation, however
austere, will remove all risks, it is very apparent that nation-states and
non-state actors have engaged in robust exfiltration of data from
government information systems, including the DOD's systems.24
21 See, e.g., Edmund X. DeJesus, Airborne Viruses, INFO. SECURITY MAG., Apr. 2001, at
9, available at http://islab.oregonstate.edu/news/2001-04-15.pdf. Notions of "air gap"
protection have changed over time. Prior to the widespread use of wireless technology,
the "air gap" was thought of as a pure protection. See, e.g., Steven A. Heinrich &
Roxana Dastur Malladi, News of the Wired: Security, the Network, and the Networked
Office, 56 OR. ST. B. BULL. 15, 16 (1995). The Oregon Bar advised law firms:
The only foolproof protection against penetration of a system is an
"air gap." The only way that a computer or a networked office can
be fully protected from hackers is to have a physical gap separating
every computer in that office system from the Internet or the
telephone system. The term "air gap" means an absolute
communications gap between the computer system and the Net or
the telephone.
However, wireless technology has rendered this type of security obsolete.
22 "Air gap" architecture is explained in BIDGOLI, INFORMATION SECURITY, supra note
18, at 522-524.
23 These factors are found in a number of Executive Statements and DOD publications.
See, e.g., NAT'L MIL. STRATEGY, supra note 3, at 15-19; U.S. DEP'T OF DEF. DIR. 5205.2,
OPERATIONAL SECURITY (OPSEC) PROGRAM (29 Nov. 1999) [hereinafter DODD
5205.2].24 See, e.g., GENERAL JAMES T. CONWAY, ADMIRAL GARY ROUGHEAD & ADMIRAL THAD
W. ALLEN, A COOPERATIVE STRATEGY FOR TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY SEAPOWER (Oct.
2007), available at http://www.navy.mil/maritime/MaritimeStrategy.pdf.
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Moreover, the 2007 Estonian experience, in which denial of service
attacks encumbered that allied government's ability to rely on its
information systems, must concern the integrity of DOD systems.
25
Fifth and finally, a definition of official use and unofficial use in
terms of Internet access does not currently exist in the DOD lexicon.
For the purpose of this article, unofficial use is defined as a use which
does not relate to the functions or necessities of DOD personnel or
26mission sets. For instance, individuals accessing weather information
in preparation for a TDY or real estate information in preparation for a
permanent change of station (PCS) move may articulate the search as
related to official duty. On the other hand, when individuals access
those same sites prior to a personal vacation or for non-PCS investment
reasons, there is little likelihood the same articulation to mission nexus
can occur.
Access to the Internet from any location occurs with a number
of inherent risks. These risks include the transfer of malicious code,
which may be designed to remotely corrupt or commandeer a computer
system, destroy the system, implant a virtual beacon on the system to
provide information to a far-way user, or convey false information
through the user's system.27 One recent study concluded that 80% of
legitimate sites have malicious code implanted.28 The exponential
growth of malicious codes has affected the DOD systems, making them
increasingly vulnerable to the risks noted above. Technical solutions
provide only a short-term solution and a partial insurance against these
25 See, e.g., Steven Myers, Cyberattack on Estonia Stirs Fears of 'Virtual War," N.Y.
TIMES.COM, May 18, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com (last visited Sept. 15, 2009);
Associated Press, Estonian Links Moscow to Internet Attack, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2007,
available at http://www.nytimes.com (last visited Sept. 15, 2009). The Estonian cyber
experience is by no means the only conflict involving cyberspace which should concern
national security. NATO operations in Kosovo were frequently the target of hackers.
See, e.g., George K. Walker, Information Warfare and Neutrality, 33 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1079, 1082-1084 (2000).26 This definition is taken in part from U.S. DEP'T OF DEF. JOINT PUB. 1-02, DICTIONARY
OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS, supra note 1, which defines "Official
Information" as "information that is owned by, produced for or by, or is subject to the
control of the United States Government." Id. at 390.
27 See Internet Denial of Service Attacks and the Federal Response: Joint Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice Oversight of the S. Judiciary Comm and the
Crime Subcomm. of the H. Judiciary Comm., 106th Cong. 35-37 (2000) (statement of
Michael A. Vatis, Director, FBI National Infrastructure Protection Center); see also
Cyber Threats and the US. Economy: Joint Hearing Before the Econ. Comm., 106th
Cong. (2000) (statement of Dr. Mark Graff, Sun Microsystems), 2000 WL 11068388.
28 See, e.g., White Hat, Malicious Code Study (2008) (on file with Joint Task Force Global
Network Operations, Arlington, Va.); Symantec, Security Response Team White Papers,
Privacy: A Study of Attitudes and Behaviors in US, UK and EU Information Security
Professionals (Oct. 2003), http://www.symantec.com (last visited Sept. 17, 2009);
McAFEE, MAPPING THE MAL-WEB REvqSITED (Jun. 4, 2008), http://www.mcafee.com (last
visited Sept. 17, 2009).
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risks, primarily because the ability of malicious code developers
matches the ability of security advances.
Like most computer networks, DOD computer information
systems provide a ready access to the Internet.29 During any given
twenty-four hour period the Internet is accessed over one billion times
from roughly seven million DOD owned computers. 30  The
overwhelming majority of this traffic occurs on the Non-Secure Internet
Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET). In an ongoing study, over two-
thirds of Internet access from DOD computers occurs for non-official
purposes. The types of sites accessed including dating services, resort
and vacation sites, car purchases, electronic stock and commercial
trading, sports sites, and "streaming video" sites.31 While it is remotely
possible a small minority of users accessing these sites could argue the
access occurred for an official DOD purpose, one would be hard pressed
to believe the bulk of the access was for a mission-related function.
Despite the fact that the NIPRNET is non-secure, a number of
protected, encrypted, or coded DOD functions occur across it. These
functions include pay and leave access, transfer and tracking of
component parts, the bulk of aircraft schedules, medical information
transfers, fuel data, travel schedules of ranking officers and civilian
personnel, real-time communications, and a variety of other data which
is closely guarded and essential for military operations.32 Moreover,
information may be transferred to and from the NIPRNET to the
Secured Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET), as well as higher
classified systems, placing the higher classification of SIPRNET and
other access data at risk.33
III. INADEQUACIES OF CURRENT REGULATIONS
Prior to examining current departmental and service regulations,
it is essential to examine 10 U.S.C. § 2224, which directs SECDEF to
develop and maintain a "Defense Information Assurance Program.,
34
The regulations examined below, in some measure, are buttressed by
this law. For instance, it requires this program to "provide continuously
29 See, e.g., Antolin-Jenkins, supra note 8 at 133. Jenkins notes that 95% of military
information traffic utilizes civilian networks at some stage of communication. Id., citing
Ronald Knecht & Ronald A. Grove, The Information Warfare Challenges of a National
Information Infrastructure (Mar. 22, 2009) (unpublished U.S. Army War College
Strategy Research Project), available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/.
30 DEF. INFO. SERVICES AGENCY REPORT (2007) (delivered to U.S. Congress, on file with
author and DISA).
31 JOINT TASK FORCE GLOBAL NETWORK OPERATIONS REPORT (2008) (delivered to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, on file with author).
32 id.
33 Id. Higher systems include Intelligence Community (IC) networks.
14 10 U.S.C. § 2224(a) (2006).
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for the availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality,
nonrepudiation, and rapid restitution of information and information
systems that are essential elements of the Defense Information
Infrastructure. ' 35 It additionally charges SECDEF to develop a program
strategy that encompasses those actions necessary to assure the
readiness, reliability, continuity, and integrity of Defense information
systems, networks, and infrastructure ....
But, as noted in the introduction, regulatory authorities do not
adequately address network threats to the DOD's mission capabilities,
and this fact shows a failing to comply with 10 U.S.C. § 2224.
Moreover, the regulations containing rules governing Internet access are
disjointed. These include departmental regulations, Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Instructions, service regulations, and individualized
user agreements. Moreover, while rescission of security clearances
based on Internet misuse has also been sustained by administrative law
judges, this is merely a "backdoor" method for addressing the problem
and available in only limited circumstances. 37 For reasons noted below,
none of these regulations satisfactorily mitigates the threats described
above.
A. Joint Ethics Regulation
Department of Defense Directive 5500.7-R, the Joint Ethics
Regulation (hereafter JER)38 governs the conduct of all DOD personnel.
It was most recently updated on November 29, 2007. 39 The JER was
promulgated to buttress public trust in the Department of Defense.40 It
also serves as a mirror to the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) and
other government instruments serving the same purpose.41
" 10 U.S.C. § 2224(b) (2006).
36 10 U.S.C. § 2224(c) (2006).
37 SSN: Applicant for Security Clearance, ISCR Case No. 02-29244, 2005 DOHA
LEXIS 681 (Defense Office of Hearings & Appeals Apr. 6, 2005); SSN: Applicant for
Security Clearance, ISCR Case No. 02-16613, 2004 DOHA LEXIS 86 (Defense Office
of Hearings & Appeals Mar. 10, 2004). Both of these cases involve a contractor's loss
of clearance after violating government regulations on internet misuse prohibiting
paornography.8U.S. DE'T OF DEF., Din. 5500.7-R, JOINT ETUCs REG. (30 Aug. 1993) (C6, 29 Nov.
2007) [hereinafter JER]. The Department of Defense General Counsel manages the
Joint Ethics Regulation and all programs underneath it. Id. § 1-407.39 Id. at 43.4 0 1d. § 1-300.
41 See Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch, 5 C.F.R. §
2635 (1978). Department personnel are also required to comply with 5 C.F.R §
2635.101(a) which states:
Public service is a public trust. Each employee has a
responsibility [to the United States Government and its citizens to
place loyalty to the Constitution, laws and ethical principles above
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The JER governs such areas as political activities, relationships
between DOD personnel and contractors, gifts between superiors and
subordinates, expenditures of government monies for conferences, and
attendance at private events. The JER's primary strengths are that it is
the most holistic governance for DOD personnel in regard to
professional behavioral standards and it does not contradict the Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Moreover, the JER provides the due
process notice requirements for enumerated military offenses under
which violations may be charged.42 Violations of the JER may be
charged against persons subject to the UCMJ through Article 92.
At first glance, the JER should provide some authority to
regulate unofficial access to the Internet because is a fundamental
principle of administrative law that an agency is bound to adhere to its
own regulations." However, as a disciplinary tool, the JER has rarely
served as the basis for charging UCMJ offenses in courts-martial.
Indeed, the appellate record of published cases is slim. In United States
v. Crafter,45 the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) upheld
a court-martial conviction based on the provision of the JER prohibiting
bribery.46 CAAF has also upheld a conviction for accessing child
pornography and bestiality websites charged under the JER 47 However,
private gain. To ensure that every citizen can have complete
confidence in the integrity of the Federal Government, each
employee shall respect and adhere to the principles of ethical
conduct set forth in this section, as well as the implementing
standards contained in this part and in supplemental agency
regulations.
42 See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 755 (1974) (An accused must be on notice
that his conduct is unlawful and that the article fairly informs "that the particular
conduct which he engaged in was punishable"). Although the notice requirement of the
Joint Ethics Regulation has apparently not been challenged at the appellate level, it is
reasonable to assume it meets this due process standard.
43 See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES pt. IV, 16a (2008)
[hereinafter MCM].
44 Frizelle v. Slater, 111 F.3d 172, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
45 United States v. Marcum, 60 M.J. 209 (C.A.A.F. 2006).
46Id. at 210. The specification read:
[D]id, at or near Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, on or about 9
May 9 2002, violate a lawful general regulation, to wit: the Joint
Ethics Regulation, Department of Defense Directive 5500.7-R,
Chapter 5, 5-400(a), dated 30 August 1993, by wrongfully
accepting currency of some value for arranging for Federal Prison
Camp Inmate [G] to meet in private with his friend [Ms. ADP] at a
billeting room at the Southern Pines Inn, a willful violation of [his]
lawful duties to supervise the work of the said Federal Prison Camp
Inmate.
47 See United States v. Hays, 62 M.J. 158 (C.A.A.F. 2005).
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bribery and child pornography are already prohibited in other
regulations, raising the question as to why the JER was incorporated
into a UCMJ charge and specification in the first place.
Civilian employment within the DOD has been terminated on
the basis of JER violations as well, but only rarely. The Merit Systems
Protection Board (MSPB), the primary governing body for adjudicating
challenges to adverse employment decisions, has upheld agency
decisions to terminate employment for such reasons as monetary debts
to subordinates,48 using government computers for personal business
and sending sexually suggestive e-mails to other employees, 49 accepting
gifts from subordinates exceeding the amount permitted under the
regulation,50 and, sexual harassment.5'
However, it does not appear that under either the JER, or its
incorporation under the UCMJ, that any charges have occurred for
excessive unofficial non-pornographic Internet access or access for
personal recreational purposes. Accessing pornography has been amply
charged against both uniformed service members and non-uniformed
DOD employees but usually not under the JER.
In terms enabling the sought-after paradigm change, the JER
possesses inherent weaknesses beyond the obvious statistical evidence.
To begin, the regulation in section 2-301 lumps computer use in the
same category as other modes of government-owned communications,
to include telephones and facsimile machines.52 While service members
have been prosecuted for using government telephones, military law
favors charging unofficial telephone use under UCMJ, Article 121,
prohibiting larceny, rather than under the JER.53 It would be difficult to
charge unofficial access to the Internet under the same article
prohibiting larceny because that particular article requires the
government to prove the user's intent to permanently deprive the owner
of a property, that the property had a rightful owner, and that the
property had an actual value, or at least some nominal value.54
48 See 5 U.S.C. § 1204 (2006) for the authority of the MSPB. See also, Fine v. Peters,
2000 EEOPUB LEXIS 4525 (U.S. Equal Employment Opp. Comm. 2000).
49 Barnes v. Dep't of Def., 2006 MSPB LEXIS 3148 (Merit Systems Protection Board
2006).
s0 Siozon-Peterson v. Dep't of the Air Force, 2005 MSPB LEXIS 2067 (Merit Systems
Protection Board 2005).
51 Reynolds v. Dep't of the Army, 2003 MSPB LEXIS 1087 (Merit Systems Protection
Board 2003).
52 JER, supra note 38, § 2-301(a).
53 See, e.g., United States v. Comell, 15 M.J. 932 (C.M.A. 1983) (determining that
personal telephone use could be charged as larceny, instead of under the JER); United
States v. Abeyta, 12 M.J. 507 (A.C.M.R. 1981) (determining that personal telephone use
could be charged as larceny, instead of under the JER).
54 MCM, supra note 43, pt. IV, T 46b(1); see also United States v. Batiste, 11 M.J. 791
(A.F.C.M.R. 1981) (theft of urine sample a proper charge for larceny even though urine
generally possesses no known value). Unlike urine, which has a theoretical owner, it is
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The JER does not take into account the risk to the GIG or the
nature of the NIPRNET. Indeed, it does not even make use of those
terms anywhere within its voluminous rules. Telephones and facsimile
machines do not, as a general rule, have the capability of transferring
malicious code, serve as an effective tool for the exfiltration of data, or
possess the inherent capability of a takeover from an operator at a
remote site.
Section 2-301(a) governs the use of DOD computers under the
aegis of "Use of Government Resources."" The regulation defines
official use to include such matters as: emergency communications,
communications to military members and other DOD employees who
are deployed or in extended TDY status.
Yet, the regulation permits commanders flexibility to permit
DOD personnel at a normal workplace to conduct brief internet searches
beyond matters involving official business or family communications
under certain conditions reflecting the overarching ethics rules. 56 The
JER does not define brief internet searches, leaving one to conclude that
the content of such searches are only constrained by what is already
prohibited under other regulations or laws such as pornography, child
pornography, gambling, or political activities.5 7
As a further example of the regulation's permissive nature,
wide-ranging Internet searches are permitted when that activity does not
adversely affect the performance of official duties of the DOD employee
or organization. Although the regulation does not define the term
unlikely the prosecution could claim that the government was deprived of the GIG or
that the GIG possesses a quantifiable - albeit nominal - value. It may be the case that
the Internet is public and therefore abandoned property. See, e.g., United States v.
Meeks, 32 M.J. 1033, 1035-1036 (A.F.C.M.R. 1992); United States v. Walls, 2 C.M.R.
650 (A.F.B.R. 1951). Moreover, the proof required to determine that a user who
accesses the Internet for unofficial uses intended to deprive the government of its
property could not likely be met by any reasonable quantum.
5 See JER, supra note 38, § 2-301(a). The JER notes: "Federal Government
communication systems and equipment (including Government owned telephones,
facsimile machines, electronic mail, internet systems, and commercial systems when in
use is paid for by the Federal Government) shall be for official use and authorized
purposes only."6Id.
57 JER, supra note 38, § 2-301(a)(2)(d) reads:
Do not put Federal Government communication systems to uses that
would reflect adversely on the DOD or the DOD Component (such
as uses involving pornography; chain letters; unofficial advertising,
soliciting or selling except on authorized bulletin boards established
for such use; violations of statute or regulation; inappropriately
handled classified information; and other uses that are incompatible
with public service) ....
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"brief," it permits use that is of "reasonable duration and frequency"58
and serves "a legitimate public interest." 59  The regulation does not
define "legitimate public interest," but it provides examples such as
"enhancing the professional skills of" DOD employees or "job
searching., 60 Therein is the proof that the JER's drafters missed the
fundamental risk factors in Internet access in that it is a matter of access
and not time spent on any particular activity which creates risk in the
first place.
B. Other DOD-Wide Regulations
Other regulations exist which govern the use of the government
information systems as well as the GIG, but none directly addresses the
social behaviors of accessing the Internet. For instance, DODD
8500.01 E, Information Assurance,6' articulates policy to regulate access
to the internet, but primarily through technological solutions. 62  Its
implementation instruction, DODI 8500.2, Information Assurance (IA)
63Implementation, places on all DOD personnel the responsibility to
only access data for "which they are authorized or have a need to
know." 64 While 8500.02 provides defined language, it is not a regulation
under which DOD personnel may be disciplined for unofficial Internet
access, though arguably if the access resulted in damage or disruption to
58 See JER, supra note 38, § 2-301(a)(2)(b).
'9 Id. § 2-301(a)(2)(c).
60 id.
61 U.S. DEP'T OF DEF. DIR. 8500.01E, INFORMATION AsSURANCE (Oct. 24, 2002; certified
current as of Apr. 23, 2007) [hereinafter DODD 8500.01E].621Id. para. 4.12.
DOD information systems shall regulate remote access and access to
the Internet by employing positive technical controls such as proxy
services and screened subnets, also called demilitarized zones
(DMZ), or through systems that are isolated from all other DOD
information systems through physical means. This includes remote
access for steelwork.
Id.
63 U.S. DEP'T OF DEF. INSTR. 8500.2, INFORMATION ASSURANCE (IA) IMPLEMENTATION
(Feb. 6, 2003) [hereinafter DODI 8500.2].
64 ld. para. 5.12.
DOD information systems shall regulate remote access and access to
the Internet by employing positive technical controls such as proxy
services and screened subnets, also called demilitarized zones
(DMZ), or through systems that are isolated from all other DOD
information systems through physical means. This includes remote
access for steelwork.
Id.
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DOD information systems, DOD personnel might become the subject of
an investigation.
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI),
6211.02C, Defense Information Systems Network (DISN) Policy,
Responsibilities, and Processes, 65 imposes responsibility on all DOD
personnel to protect classified information, including classified
information on DOD networks.66 It also provides parameters of
"authorized uses" for government information systems capable of
accessing the internet. But the parameters for acceptable Internet access
in this instruction mirror those in the JER.67 CJCSI 6510.01E,
Information Assurance (IA) and Computer Network Defense (CND),68
provides additional authority to hold accountable individuals who place
government information systems at risk through negligent conduct or
intent. The range of accountability includes terminating an individual's
ability to access the Internet from a government information system.69
However, CJCSI 6510.01E does not require combatant commands,
services, and agencies to reduce the amount of Internet access.
C. Service Rules and Regulations
Army Regulation (AR) 25-1, Knowledge Management and
Information Technology, establishes the policies and assigns
responsibilities for the management of information resources and
65 CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION 6211.02C, DEFENSE
INFORMATION SYSTEM NETWORK (DISN): POLICY, RESPONSIBILITIES AND PROCESSES (9
Jul. 2008) [hereinafter CJCSI 6211.02C].
66 Id. encl. B, para. 9.r.
DOD and non-DOD personnel (including supporting contractor
personnel) are held personally and individually responsible and
accountable for providing proper protection of classified
information, controlled unclassified information, ISs, and/or
networks under their custody and control .... DOD officials who
hold command, management (e.g., DAA and Information Assurance
Manager), or supervisory positions (e.g., Information Assurance
Officer or supervisors) will ensure that the Information Security
Program is efficiently implemented and managed within their areas
of responsibility ....
Id.
67 Id., para. n.
68 CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION 6510.01E, INFORMATION
ASSURANCE (IA) AND COMPUTER NETWORK DEFENSE (CND) (15 Aug. 2007, current as
of 12 Aug. 2008) [hereinafter CJCSI 6510.01E].
69 While this document articulates roles and responsibilities of commands and
individuals, a CJCSI is not a regulation of a punitive nature.
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information technology. 70 This regulation governs intemet access for all
personnel assigned to, or employed by, the Department of the Army.
While the entirety of AR 25-1 is not punitive, the regulation notes there
are punitive portions.71
Of importance, unlike the JER, the authors of AR 25-1
evidenced their understanding of the GIG by incorporating and defining
the NIPRNET and SIPRNET into the regulation. Notably, AR 25-1
prohibits computer activity "that could reasonably be expected to"
congest, delay, or disrupt computer service.
7 2
In one sense, the language contained in AR 25-1 is superior to
that found in the JER. Specific intent is not the liability standard for
violations.73 Thus only a general negligence of Internet access which
70 U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, REG. 25-1, KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY (4 Dec. 2008) [hereinafter AR 25-1].
71 Id. at i. The regulation notes, "Portions of this regulation, which prescribes specific
prohibitions, are punitive, and violations of these provisions may subject offenders to
nonjudicial or judicial action under the Uniform Code of Military Justice." Id.
72 Id. at para. 6-1.f(5) (prohibiting the use of Army communications systems in ways
"that could reasonably be expected to cause, directly or indirectly, congestion, delay, or
disruption of service to any computing facilities or cause unwarranted or unsolicited
interference with others' use of communications") While the regulation provides
examples of conduct which could cause a detriment, the list is not all-inclusive. The list
reads:
(a) Create, download, store, copy, transmit, or broadcast chain
letters.
(b) "Spam" to exploit list servers or similar broadcast systems for
purposes beyond their intended scope to amplify the widespread
distribution of unsolicited e-mail.
(c) Send a "letter-bomb" to re-send the same e-mail message
repeatedly to one or more recipients, to interfere with the recipient's
use of e-mail.
(d) Broadcast unsubstantiated virus warnings from sources other
than systems administrators.
(e) Broadcast e-mail messages to large groups of e-mail users (entire
organizations) instead of targeting the relevant audience.
69 Employ applications for personal use using streaming data, audio,
and video; malicious logic and virus development software, tools,
and files; unlicensed software; games; Web altering tools/software;
and other software that maycause harm to Government computers
and telecommunications systems.
(g) Disseminating large files over e-mail instead of using shared
drives ....
Id.
73 See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez-Landaverde, 65 F. Supp. 2d 567 (S.D. Tex,
1999). Specific intent is defined at common law as follows:
The intent to accomplish the precise criminal act that one is later
charged with. General intent is defined as "the state of mind
required for the commission of certain crimes not requiring specific
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results in system degradation is required to hold a person punitively
accountable for violating the regulation. Despite the recognition of
threats to the GIG, AR 25-1 incorporates the permissive access to
Internet doctrine found in the JER.74 This permissiveness includes,
personal "brief Internet searches," without providing any further
parameters as to the meaning of the limitation.75
Air Force Instruction (AFI) 33-129, Communications and
Information: Web Management and Use, is the Air Force's counterpart
to AR 25-1.76 Like AR 25-1, it provides a framework for access,
modeled on the JER. 77 Also, like its Army counterpart, AFI 33-129
provides a non-inclusive list of inappropriate use. This list is broader
than AR 25-1 as it also prohibits modifying or altering the network
operating system or system, and permitting an unauthorized individual
to access a DOD computer system. However those two examples are
intent. General intent usually takes the form of recklessness
(involving actual awareness of a risk and the culpable taking of that
risk), or negligence (involving blameworthy inadvertence)."
Id. at 571 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 813 (7th ed. 1999)).
74 AR 25-1, para. 6-1.d(l) ("The Joint Ethics Regulation, Section 2-301, serves as the
basis for Army policy on the use of telecommunications and computing systems. Users
will abide by these restrictions to prevent security compromises and disruptions to Army
communications systems.").
75 AR 25-1, para. 6-I.e. The regulation states the following:
Authorized use includes brief communications made by DOD
employees while they are traveling on Government business to
notify family members of transportation or schedule changes. They
also include personal communications from the DOD employee's
usual workplace that are most reasonably made while at the work
place (such as checking in with spouse or minor children;
scheduling doctor and auto or home repair appointments; brief
Internet searches; e-mailing directions to visiting relatives). Such
communications may be permitted, provided they-
(1) Do not adversely affect the performance of official duties by the
employee or the employee's organization.
(2) Are of reasonable duration and frequency, and, whenever
possible, are made during the employee's personal time, such as
during lunch, break, and other off-duty periods).
(3) Are not used for activities related to the operation of a personal
business enterprise ....
Id.
76 U.S. DEP'T OF AIR FORCE, INSTR. 33-129, Communications and Information: WEB
MANAGEMENT AND INTERNET USE (3 Feb. 2005, incorporating changes through
12 Sep. 2009).
77 See id. para. 2.1, which states: "Appropriate Use. Government-provided hardware
and software are for official use and authorized purposes only. Appropriate officials
may authorize personal uses consistent with the requirements of DDOD 5500.7-R, Joint
Ethics Regulation (JER)..
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prohibited in other regulations. Moreover, AFI 33-129 is unique in
prohibiting the use of measures to circumvent blocked sites or other
78security systems.
IV. COURSES OF ACTION
There are at least four possible courses of action to effectuate a
change in the current paradigm of almost-open Internet access. The
DOD can draft a new regulation (or series of regulations) limiting
access to the Internet through government information systems. Such a
regulation would be divorced from the JER, but the JER would, in turn,
require modification to section 2-301.
A second course of action is to have local commanders
recognize the inherent risks of the current paradigm, preempt the JER
and draft lawful orders applicable to the commander's respective
installation, command, or vessel. In the legal rubric of lawful
command, it is, of course, possible for the President or SECDEF to issue
a lawful command limiting Internet access through government
information systems. This course of action could occur at a far more
rapid rate than issuing a regulation but would come at the cost of
denying full input from the services, combatant commands, and field
agencies.
A third course of action would be to draft a new regulation, but
while the process of drafting, input, and promulgation is occurring,
permit local commanders to issue lawful orders. This course of action is
essentially a hybrid of the prior two. Finally, a fourth course of action is
to do nothing, and permit the JER and other service regulations and user
agreements to regulate internet access through government information
systems.
A. Lawful Order
Historically, the most immediate means of effectuating an
enforceable policy change has been the issuance of a lawful order from
a command authority. While lawful orders are generally issued by
officers commanding installations or vessels, the President, followed by
the SECDEF, are the two highest command authorities. 79  They are
78 Id. paras. 2.2.1-2.2.14 list prohibited actions. Para. 2.2.9 prohibits attempts to
"circumvent or defeat security or modifying security systems without prior authorization
or permission (such as for legitimate system testing or security research)."
79 The basis for this construct is deeply rooted in American Constitutional jurisprudence.
See, e.g. 10 U.S.C. §§ 111, 113 (2006); Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827)
(authority over all military forces under the President's constitutional status as
commander in chief); Little v. Bareme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch.) 170 (1804) (presidential
authority over all service members not unlimited but very broad).
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constitutionally empowered to issue orders which have a service-wide
effect.80
In terms of hierarchy and reach of authority, the three Service
Secretaries, four commissioned chiefs of their respective services, and
the combatant commanders follow. 8' The authority to issue a lawful
order descends to the lowest command level.8 2 Depending on the
service, location, and chain of command, the level of authority may
simply be whoever is of highest rank in a given chain. 83 But, only the
President and Defense Secretary have the ability to directly order the
entire Department to comply with a policy.
8 4
The UCMJ, Article 92, governs the punitive nature of lawful
orders. The essential attributes of a lawful order include: (1) issuance
by competent authority-a person authorized by applicable law to give
such an order; (2) communication of words that express a specific
mandate to do or not do a specific act; and (3) relationship of the
mandate to a military duty. 5 Orders are generally presumed to be
lawful, and it is for a judge to decide whether this is the case. 86 An
80 SECDEF may issue a general order which binds all service members (and by
implication all civilian federal employees of the Department), notwithstanding that
directives, regulations, and instructions are almost always conveyed in a specific format.
See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 25 C.M.R. 20 (C.M.A. 1957); United States v. Snyder,
4 C.M.R. 15 (C.M.A. 1952).
81 1986 DOD Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 99-433, 100 Stat. 1013 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.).
82 See United States v. Voorhees, 16 C.M.R. 83, 96 (C.M.A. 1954) ("A general order or
regulation is lawful if not contrary to or forbidden by the Constitution . .. an Act of
Congress or the lawful order of a superior authority").
83 See MCM, supra note 43, pt. IV, 14 & 16.
84 Id., pt. IV, I 16(c)(1)(a); expressly gives to the SECDEF the authority to issue a
punitive general order. A general order from the SECDEF may only be superseded by
an order from the President or by a rescission from the SECDEF. No service or
commanding general orders may contradict or modify the order. Unlike a directive or
policy memo, an order is clearly applicable to all service members without distinction of
position or rank (unless the order permits distinctions or exceptions based on legitimate
service requirements).
85 United States v. Deisher, 61 M.J. 313, 317 (C.A.A.F. 2005); United States v. New, 55
M.J. 95, 100 (C.A.A.F. 2001); United States v. Hughey, 46 M.J. 152, 154 (C.A.A.F.
1997); MCM, supra note 43, pt. 14, c(2)(a).
86 United States v. New, 55 M.J. 95, 107 (C.A.A.F. 2001), quoting from Article 92:
The order must relate to military duty, which includes all activities
reasonably necessary to accomplish a military mission, or safeguard or
promote the morale, discipline, and usefulness of members of a command
and directly connected with the maintenance of good order in the service.
The order may not, without such a valid military purpose, interfere with
private rights or personal affairs. However, the dictates of a person's
conscience, religion, or personal philosophy cannot justify or excuse the
disobedience of an otherwise lawful order.
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order, in addition to showing its intent to regulate some aspect of
behavior of servicemen, must state clearly whether it is punitive.
The issuance of multiple lawful orders across the DOD has two
inherent difficulties rooted in law. Firstly, it is a fundamental due
process right that DOD personnel have fair notice of the criminality of a
prohibited conduct before being charged or convicted of an offense. 8 If
every military base, post, encampment, or station has its own separate
set of rules, those particular rules have to be visible and understood by
the persons falling within the jurisdictional reach of those specific
rules. 89 Even in a scenario in which major commands create their own
independent rules, the issue of notice will exist, in part, because military
personnel transfer from post to post. While the difficulty of providing
notice is not insurmountable, it is far less difficul if the order is issued
from the highest levels.
Secondly, one of the potential enforcement problems with
commanders independently issuing orders in the absence of a regulation
may be challenges based on the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of "equal
protection." 90  Rooted in due process, "equal protection" protects
individuals from differences in treatment from a convening authority. 91
Within the services, different commanders may issue differing
orders, with unique prohibitions. A violator of one order might seek to
challenge a commander's decision to offer non-judicial punishment or
prefer charges for violating the order. While "equal protection"
challenges might arise from the fact that each of the services (or, the
major commands within each service) have different prohibitions
against unofficial Internet access, the majority of these challenges would
87 The MCM reflects the fact that a myriad of regulations, instructions, and manuals
govern virtually every aspect of military life, and that most of these issuances are not
intended to establish the criminal offense of violating a lawful general regulation. See
United States v. Nardell, 45 C.M.R. 101 (C.M.A. 1972); United States v. Hogsett, 25
C.M.R. 185 (C.M.R. 1958).
88 See, e.g., United States v. Tolkach, 14 M.J. 239 (C.M.A. 1982).
89 See United States v. Pope, 63 M.J. 68, 73-75 (C.A.A.F. 2007); see also Cole v.
Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201 (1948).
90 U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). In
Skinner, the Court held that "when the law lays an unequal hand on those who have
committed intrinsically the same quality of offense ... it has made as invidious a
discrimination as if it had selected a particular race or nationality for oppressive
treatment."Skinner at 541 (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)); see also
Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
91 For a good discussion of equal protection in military law see United States v.
Courtney, 1 M.J. 438, 441 (C.M.A. 1976), and, most recently, United States v. Paulk, 66
M.J. 641 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2008). In Paulk, the Air Force Court determined it was
not a violation of equal protection if Air Force judges were non-tenured for a fixed term
of service, while Department of the Army military judges and Coast Guard military
judges served for fixed-tenure terms. The Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal
Appeals determined similarly to the Air Force Court in United States v. Gaines, 61 M.J.
689 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2005).
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fail. "Equal protection" usually applies to constitutionally suspect
classes of individuals who have historically suffered discrimination
based on race, religion, or national origin.92  In 1981, the Court of
Military Appeals (the predecessor to CAAF), in United States v.
Means,93 determined that the rank or status of an individual could be a
determining factor in a commander's decision to refer a military
member to a court-martial as long as the status did not involve race,
religion, national origin, or another protected factor. 94
Lawful orders may exist in the form of standard "user
agreements," in which the user of government computers agrees not to
engage in non-mission related web surfing. Clearly a standard "user
agreement" will be an appropriate instrument to provide notice as to a
prohibition against unofficial access to the Internet. But alone, arguably
the user agreement is not enough to create a culture change in Internet
access.
B. Regulations
Punitive general orders issued directly from the Secretary of
Defense to the entire Department have been rare since the Goldwater-
Nichols Act. This is because the Department adopted a means for
projecting policies, regulations, and other rules to its service members
and federal employees mirroring the Code of Federal Regulations.
The issuance of regulations to the services is a function of the
executive branch, which mirrors the legal construct of issuing lawful
orders but occurs as a defined process. 95 However, in comparison to
92 United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (1979); 3 R. ROTUNDA AND J. NOWAK,
TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 18.38, at 488, 18.41
at 495 (3d ed. 1999).
93 United States v. Means, 10 M.J. 162 (C.M.A. 1981).
94 Id, at 165. In Means, the Court determined that the commissioned officer status of an
accused is a permissible factor in determining to refer a trial for courts-martial. The
court held:
Even if appellant's officer status had been a principal factor-
indeed, the decisive factor-in the convening authority's decision to
refer the case to a general court-martial, appellant would still have
no valid constitutional grievance. For the Government to make
distinctions does not violate equal protection guarantees unless
constitutionally suspect classifications like race, religion, or national
origin are utilized or unless there is an encroachment on
fundamental constitutional rights like freedom of speech or of
peaceful assembly. The only requirement is that reasonable grounds
exist for the classification used.
Id.
" 10 U.S.C. § 121 (2006). "The President may prescribe regulations to carry out his
functions, powers, and duties under this title." Id.
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posting an order, the drafting and issuance of regulations is time
consuming because it involves the comments and concerns of the
service departments, combatant commands, and agencies.9 6  On the
other hand, published regulations which specifically prohibit unofficial
Internet access from DOD computers are the optimum means of
establishing a single department-wide framework for mitigating risks
from malicious code. There are, of course, legal considerations before
drafting and implementing such regulations.
As in the case of lawful orders, any regulatory changes which
affect the conditions of employment will likely require negotiation with
collective bargaining units.97 While localized orders prohibiting
unofficial access to the Intemet will, at most, require limited notice to
collective bargaining units, a DOD-wide regulation may require
negotiation with multiple collective bargaining units representing
personnel.
A new regulation will also require other changes. Certainly, the
adaptation of a new regulation will require ancillary amendments to
other existing regulations such as the JER, and the Department of
Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms will have to be
updated to include the term "mission use."
Another consideration is which DOD agency should be
responsible for drafting the regulation. A new regulation may be
proposed and coordinated through several venues within the DOD. The
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Network Integration
(ASD/NII) is the DOD's Chief Information Officer (CIO). The
ASD/NII CIO is charged with the responsibility for protecting the
DOD's net-centric data.98 The commander, U.S. Strategic Command
(USSTRATCOM), is charged with overall responsibility for GIG
96 For a comprehensive overview on the drafting and promulgation of regulations, as
well as amending current regulations, see generally U.S. DEP'T OF DEF. INSTR. 5025.1,
DOD DIRECTIVES PROGRAM (Oct. 28,2007) [hereinafter DODI 5025.1].
97 "Coordination with Unions Granted National Consultation Rights. DOD issuances
containing substantive changes in conditions of employment, including personnel
policies and practices and other bargaining unit matters that affect DOD civil service
and non-appropriated fund employees, shall be forwarded to the appropriate unions for
comment .. " Id. at Encl. 3, para. 7.h.
98 DODD 8320.02, supra note 1, para. 5.1.1.3, directs ASD/NII CIO to:
Develop the policies and procedures to protect Net-Centric data
while enabling data sharing across security domains and with multi-
national partners, other Federal Agencies, and State and local
governments in accordance with law, policy, and security
classification, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense
For Intelligence and the Under Secretary of Defense For Policy.
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operations and network defense in coordination with the CJCS and other
combatant commands.
99
Joint Task Force Global Network Operations (JTF-GNO), a
standing joint task force under the command of USSTRATCOM, is
organized to protect and defend the GIG.' 00 Of the twelve doctrinally
assigned tasks to JTF-GNO, the first is listed, "direct GIG NETOPS to
ensure confidentiality, integrity, availability, and efficiency of the GIG
infrastructure and information services." ' ' 1 In 2004, SECDEF ordered
the services, combatant commands, and field agencies to comply with
USSTRATCOM directives on securing the NIPRNet and SIPRNet. 
102
At a minimum, a regulation must comprehensively and clearly
articulate proscribed conduct. This conduct should include limitations
on access to the Internet for official purposes only. It should also
prohibit DOD personnel from engaging in other risky activity such as
transferring DOD information on personal thumb-drives. It must also
prohibit the use of software to by-pass technical blocking of websites.
Finally, the regulation must educate personnel as to the importance of
safeguarding government information systems.
C. Hybrid Approach
Because of the length of time it may take for the DOD to
promulgate a new regulation, independent commands may draft lawful
orders or local regulations designed to reduce the amount of unofficial
internet traffic. The only difficulty, other than those enunciated above,
99 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 6-0, JOINT COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM 11-20 (20
Mar 2006) [hereinafter JP 6-0]. The joint doctrine states, "USSTRATCOM has overall
responsibility for GIG operations and defense in coordination with CJCS and combatant
commands. CDRUSSTRATCOM is responsible for coordinating and directing DOD-
wide CND. USSTRATCOM through its JTF-GNO component executes the DOD
mission." Id.
1oo See, e.g., id. at 11-21-23; Cartwright, supra note 3, at 73.
10 JP 6-0, supra note 99, at 11-2 1.
102 Memorandum from Secretary of Defense to Secretaries of the Military Departments
et al., subject: Assignment and Delegation of Authority to Director, Defense Information
Systems Agency (DISA) (18 Jun. 2008) (on file with USSTRATCOM).
Upon receipt, the military departments will organize to execute
global network operations and network defense under the Service
Headquarters assigned to USSTRATCOM. Defense agencies will
align their global network operations and network defense
capabilities to provide USSTRATCOM visibility and insight into
network status. Military departments and agencies will respond to
USSTRATCOM's orders and direction, allowing USSTRATCOM
to defend the Global Information Grid.
Id.
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is that commands may have to rescind orders if these conflict with the
regulation.
D. Support from Other Jurisdictions.
While the issuance of regulations or orders limiting access to
the internet for official use is important, guidance from federal and state
courts, as well as administrative decisions should to be considered in the
enforcement of rules. For instance, in Eliserio v. United Steelworkers of
America, Local 310,103 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in
overruling a lower court's grant of summary judgment, found that the
enforcement of rules against Internet misuse was arbitrary and could
have occurred as a result of unlawful discrimination. 104
In Thompson v. State Civil Service Commission,10 5 the
Pennsylvania Appellate Court upheld a county's decision to terminate
an individual's government employment resulting from violations of the
county's computer use policies. Although part of the decision to
terminate employment occurred as a result of the individual accessing
sites containing nudity, evidence that the individual "surfed" the Internet
for at least twenty to thirty percent of the workday was also a reason. 
106
Decided by the Connecticut Supreme Court this year, McCann
v. Department of Environmental Protection10 7 is the most compelling
and relevant case to the issue of reducing risk through regulations on
social behavior. McCann began his employment with the state
government in 1985.108 Over time, the state issued McCann a laptop
computer. In 1998, the state government issued a directive to its
employees that government-issued computers were for "official and
authorized business purposes."' 0 9 The state informed its employees that
103 Eliserio v. United Steelworkers of Am., Local 310, 398 F.3d 1071 (8th Cir. 2005).
1o4 Id., at 1079. While the court found that five separate complaints of Internet misuse
were made against the appellant, it also found that the appellant was the only employee
disciplined by Firestone, the employer, in an eight-year period. Moreover, the appellant
was not notified of any infractions for the first four complaints. Id.
105 Thompson v. State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 863 A.2d 180 (2004). Thompson also raised
claims that his firing resulted from disparate treatment based on his union activities. See
Thompson v. County of Beaver, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 807 (W.D. Pa. 2006).
106 Thompson, 863 A.2d. at 183.
107 McCann v. Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 952 A.2d 43 (Conn. 2008).
108 Id.
109 Id. The policy stated:
All computer resources, including devices, programs, and data,
electronic or hard copy, owned or leased by the State of
Connecticut, and facilities of the State of Connecticut, which include
but are not limited to the department,, shall only be used for
legitimate and authorized business.
Id.
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violations of the directive could result in discipline including job
termination. In 2001 and 2002, McCann's supervisors reiterated the
state directive's prohibitions against unofficial use and articulated a
"zero tolerance" policy towards violators.
In 2002, the state discovered McCann had downloaded a K-
Mart commercial software package onto his computer after he brought
his computer to a repair center. A supervisor verbally reprimanded
McCann after this discovery. During an "upgrade," in 2004, a Wal-
Mart Internet commercial software program was found on a second
state-issued computer used by McCann. Additionally, computer
technologists discovered over 7,000 commercial web entries and a latent
virus capable of degrading the state's computer networks. Later that
year, a third state-issued laptop computer used by McCann was infected
after he accessed several unofficial websites.
The state notified McCann it had decided to terminate
McCann's employment based on numerous violations which placed the
state's information systems at risk. Because McCann belonged to a
collective bargaining unit, he was entitled to an administrative hearing.
The arbitrator determined McCann was given enough notice that his
conduct violated state rules and the employment termination was
justified. Important to this article's advocacy was the arbitrator's
determination that "unauthorized use of [McCann's] laptop ... caused it
to be infected with a virus that threatened the [s]tate's entire computer
network, no small matter.""
0
McCann appealed to a state trial court, which ruled that the
arbitrator failed to consider whether the state "offered McCann
progressive discipline" and improperly excluded evidence of prior
arbitrated agreements between the state and third parties who engaged in
similar conduct, as well as the issue as to whether the state had
disciplined employees for similar conduct."' The trial court determined
that the evidence did not support the arbitrator's assessment of the risk
to Connecticut's state computer systems caused by McCann's
conduct. "12
The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed the trial court's
determination as to the arbitrator's failure to include disputed evidence
but agreed that the arbitrator could not have made the risk determination
based on the quantum of evidence the state provided. 13 However, the
state supreme court upheld the arbitrator's decision to support
McCann's employment termination and, more importantly, left open the
prospect that conduct such as McCann's, which created vulnerabilities
1 01d.
111 McCann v. Connecticut, 2007 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1528 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007).
112 Id. at 8.
113 McCann, 952 A.2d at 46.
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to malicious code, could be the basis for disciplinary action. 114 This is
precisely the construct which the DOD should adopt in enforcing
regulations on unofficial Internet access.
V. CONCLUSION
One need only to look at the open source headlines and
academic literature to understand the depth of the problem facing the
DOD. These threats span a wide range, from the exfiltration of data to
full scale denial of service attacks. As previously noted, a well-
intentioned e-mail user within the DOD sent a link to an infected
Internet game site. Two current nation-state adversaries, or their
citizens, have repeatedly attempted to probe weak-points within the
DOD and defense contractors.' 1 5 At least three weeks prior to the
Russian invasion of Georgia, Russian government agencies, or its
citizens, independently stepped up cyber attacks on Georgia. 116 The
potential for a terrorist strike against DOD information systems must be
considered. The primary vector of attack will be through the Internet to
the NIPRNet connection points. In essence, the threat to DOD
information systems through cyberspace is very real, and a defense in
depth is required to meet it. The defense should begin with social
behavior, in essence, modifying the culture of permissive use, but
include technical solutions as well.
It may be the case that commanders, judge advocates, and DOD
personnel will view the implementation of a new regulation or series of
orders designed to reduce the amount of Internet access traffic as a
draconian measure. But, a decision to maintain the status quo and
continue the permissive browsing of the Internet increases the risk of
dangers ranging from exfiltration of data to a cyber "Pearl Harbor."
Understandably, the DOD and its commanders possessing
UCMJ authority may want to resist measures which will likely be
detrimental to morale. Certainly, a DOD-wide regulation should
exempt deployed servicemembers, as well as personnel assigned to
naval vessels operating at sea, because an alternative private means to
access the Internet is unlikely to exist in austere locations. It is also
understandable that commanders and departmental leaders will worry
114jd.
115 See, e.g., Julian E. Barnes, Cyber-attack on Defense Department Computers Raises
Concerns, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2008, available at http://articles.latimes.com (analysis
of Russian based cyber actions against DOD computers and the DOD's response); see
also US. Faces Cyber Threat from China, SAN FRAN. CHRON., Nov. 28, 2008, at B-10,
available at http://www.sfgate.com (articulating that the Chinese government may have
over 250 "hacker teams" in its employ, targeting the DOD and defense contractors).
116 See, Colonel Steven Korns & Major Joshua Kastenberg, Georgia 's Cyber Left Hook,
PARAMETERS, 2008, at 60; see also John Markoff, Before the Gunfire, Cyber Attacks,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com.
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about recruiting and retention, both for uniformed personnel and the
civilian workforce, and therefore not wish to create a policy limiting
use. One solution may be for the acquisition of Internet connected
computers in cafes and kiosks not connected to the .mil network. This
solution, while outside the scope of this article, should be considered for
later advocacy.
Social behavior, even in the armed services, cannot change
without education and the development of policy. This is true,
particularly, where the behavior to be limited is predicated on the
assumption that no harm is caused by it. But the risk factors involved in
unfettered internet access are too great to ignore. As a result, the DOD,
or, in the absence of DOD action, responsible commanders with the
support of their military legal community, should lay the groundwork
for changing the paradigm.
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Department of Defense
DIRECTIVE
NUMBER XXXX
[Month][Day], [Year]
Appendix 1
SUBJECT: Protection of DoD Information Systems
References: (a) DoD Directive 8100.1, "Global Information Grid (GIG)
Overarching Policy," September 19, 2002
(b) DoD 5025. 1-M, "DoD Directives System Procedures,"
current edition
(c) DoD 5500.7-R, Joint Ethics Regulation
(d) Chapter XX of title 10, United States Code
1. PURPOSE
This directive:
1.1. Establishes policy for eliminating the high level of unofficial
use of Department of Defense (DoD) information systems, including
systems used to access NIPR, SIPR, and other information systems.
1.2. Assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures for the
Military Departments, Combatant Commands (COCOMS), and agencies
regarding the use of DoD information systems and reporting of
violations of this instruction.
1.3. This instruction does not supplant or replace other
regulations, policies, and instructions governing the use of government
property or the protection, handling, and use of classified information.
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2. APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE
This directive applies to:
2.1. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military
Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant
Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of
Defense, the Defense Agencies, and all other organizational entities in
the Department of Defense (hereafter referred to collectively as "the
DoD Components").
2.2. The Coast Guard when it is not operating as a Military
Service in the Department of the Navy by agreement with the
Department of Homeland Security; and the Commissioned Corps of the
United States Public Health Service (USPHS) and the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), under agreements with the
Department of Health and Human Services (hereafter referred to
collectively as "Other Uniformed Services"). The term "Military
Services," as used herein, refers to the Army, the Navy, the Air Force,
the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard; and their respective National
Guard and Reserve components. The term "Uniformed Services" refers
to the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, the Coast
Guard, the Commissioned Corps of the USPHS, and the Commissioned
Corps of the NOAA.
2.3. DoD-owned information systems (IS) and DoD controlled IS
operated by contractors or other entities on behalf of the DoD that
receive, process, store, or display, or transmit DoD information,
regardless of classification or sensitivity, consistent with Reference (x).
3. DEFINITIONS
Terms used in this directive are defined in Enclosure 1.
4. P OLICY
Commensurate with the determination that Global Information Grid
(GIG) is a war-fighting domain, it is DoD policy to protect the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of classified and unclassified,
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but protected information, located on the GIG; and, to ensure the DoD
components have complete access to the GIG per mission needs.
4.1. Internet traffic from DoD information systems has
exponentially increased each year, creating challenges to unhindered
GIG access. These challenges include risks posed by malicious code, as
well as clogged pipelines. Furthermore, it is estimated that in FY 2007
at least 60% of all internet traffic originating from DoD information
systems is accessed for unofficial (non-mission related) purposes.
4.2. DoD information systems are also placed at risk through the
interface of private computer systems and information transfer
technologies.
4.3. With the growth and increasing complexity of malicious
code, unofficial use of the DoD information systems on the NIPRNet
must be curbed to the maximum extent practicable.
4.4. Unofficial use includes, but is not limited to: accessing
internet sites not directly related to military duty, "web-surfing,"
accessing non DoD web-mail from DoD information systems, and, the
transfer of official files from DoD computers to non-DoD computers
without the prior authorization of the first general officer in a chain of
command or civilian equivalent. It also includes the use of privately
owned (non-DoD appropriated) information transfer technologies such
as personal thumb-drives, on DoD information systems.
4.5. This directive exempts DoD personnel deployed to the
CENTCOM AOR or other deployed regions, DoD personnel aboard
naval vessels or space vehicles as a local commander may direct.
5. RESPONSIBILITIES
5.1. The Commander, United States Strategic Command
(CDRUSSTRATCOM) shall:
5.1.1. Draft and implement policy to limit the unofficial
access to the internet through DoD information systems, consistent with
the authority to operate and defend the GIG.
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5.1.2. Test and evaluate scientific and technological methods
for limiting unofficial access to the internet.
5.1.3. In cooperation with the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Networks and Network Integration, draft and develop enforceable
policy to hold accountable DoD agencies and personnel who place the
GIG at increased risk.
5.1.4. Monitor compliance with DoD policy limiting the use of
access to intemet for official purposes and make a quarterly report to
OSD.
5.1.5. Develop policy for investigating Cyber intrusion and
malicious code events.
5.1.6. Report to the Secretary of Defense the results of
investigations, the availability of the GIG, and DoD compliance to this
directive.
5.2. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and
Network Integration (ASD/NII) shall:
5.1.1. In cooperation with USSTRATCOM, draft and
implement policy to limit the unofficial access to the internet through
DoD information systems.
5.1.2. In cooperation with USSTRATCOM, monitor
compliance with this instruction
5.3 The General Counsel to the Office of the Secretary of Defense
shall:
5.3.1. Modify DoD 5500.7-R, the Joint Ethics Regulation, to
comport with this policy, and modify other departmental regulations as
needed.
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5.4. The Secretaries of the Military Departments shall:
5.4.1. Draft and implement punitive regulations to curb the use
of DoD information systems to access the internet for unofficial
purposes.
5.4.2. Modify existing service regulations to comport with this
directive.
5.4.3. Educate members of their respective services as to the
inherent dangers posed by internet access from DoD information
systems.
5.4.4. Support CDRUSTRATCOM or the designated agency
within the COCOM on all cyber intrusion investigations.
5.5. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall:
5.5.1 Develop or modify joint doctrine and associated joint
tactics, techniques, and procedures for the GIG and ensure the
compatibility of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instructions
with this regulation.
5.6. Authorized Users of DoD information systems shall:
5.6.1. Access the internet only for mission related purposes as
defined in enclosure (A)
5.6.1. Access only that data, control information, software,
hardware, and firmware for which they are authorized access and have a
need-to-know, and assume only those roles and privileges for which
they are authorized.
5.6.2. Use only DoD issued hardware and software for
transferring electronic data.
5.6.3. Report suspected violations of DoD policy to an
immediate supervisor, or if not practicable, to the next highest level.
6. EFFECTIVE DATE
This Instruction is effective immediately.
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ENCLOSURE
DEFINITIONS
E l. Global Information Grid (GIG)
El. 1 The globally interconnected, end-to-end set of information
capabilities, associated processes, and personnel for collecting,
processing, storing, disseminating and managing information on
demand to warfighters, policy makers, and support personnel. The GIG
includes all owned and leased communications and computing systems
and services, software (including applications), data, security services,
and other associated services necessary to achieve Information
Superiority. It also includes National Security Systems as defined in
section 5142 of the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996. The GIG supports all
Department of Defense, National Security, and related Intelligence
Community missions and functions (strategic, operational, tactical, and
business), in war and in peace. The GIG provides capabilities from all
operating locations (bases, posts, camps, stations, facilities, mobile
platforms, and deployed sites). The GIG provides interfaces to
coalition, allied, and non-DoD users and systems.
El.2. Includes any system, equipment, software, or service that
meets one or more of the following criteria: transmits information to,
receives information from, routes information among, or interchanges
information (DODD 8100.1).
E3. NIPRNET. Non-Classified Internet Protocol Router Network. A
computer network for unclassified, but sensitive information supporting
the DoD (JP 6-0).
E4. SIPRNET: Secret Internet Protocol Router Network. The
worldwide SECRET-level packet switch network that uses high-speed
internet protocol routers and high-capacity Defense Information
Systems Network circuitry (JP 6-0).
E5. UNOFFICIAL USE: Use which does not relate to the functions or
necessities of DoD personnel or mission sets.
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SECDEF GENERAL ORDER #1
From: Honorable Robert M. Gates
SECDEF
To:
Date:
1. Statement of Military Purpose and Necessity: The amount of DoD
network resources devoted to internet and web traffic has increased
exponentially over the past several years. Analysis indicates the
majority of this traffic occurs for non official purposes. Not only does
this drain resources better devoted to the DoD mission, but each
connection exposes DoD networks to additional risk. The aggregate
risk across DoD associated with this unnecessary exposure is substantial
and unacceptable. DoD personnel have long operated on the
assumption that using DoD network resources for personal purposes
was cost free. It is not. DoD networks must be reclaimed for official
use only.
2. Prohibited Activities:
a. Use of DoD computers and/or networks to access the internet
and world wide web resources if the intended purpose of that access
does not serve an official purpose. Examples of prohibited activities
include recreational web surfing; personal use of social networking,
gaming, and shopping sites; and the use of peer-to-peer networks.
b. The connection of any personal electronic device or media
to DoD computing equipment.
c. Connection from DoD networks to any web-mail services
hosted outside the .mil domain.
d. The transfer of non-public DoD files to home systems; the
transfer of files from home system back to DoD systems.
3. Email: This order does not place additional restrictions on whether
DoD personnel may send personal email from DoD-supplied email
accounts beyond what is already regulated through DoD Directive
5500.7, dated 30 August 1991 (Joint Ethics Regulation), or prohibited
by other laws and policy.
4. Punitive Order: Paragraph 2 of this General Order is punitive.
Persons subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice may be
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punished thereunder. Civilians serving with or employed by the Armed
Forces of the United States may face adverse administrative action for
violation of this General Order.
5. Individual Duty: All persons subject to this General Order are
charged with the individual duty to refrain from any use of DoD
computers and networks in a manner that unnecessarily (other than an
official purpose) connects them through the Internet/World Wide Web
to non DoD systems. Questions regarding whether a particular use
serves an official purpose should be referred, in advance, to a supervisor
or commander.
6. Unit Commander Responsibility: Unit commanders and supervisors
are charged to ensure all personnel are briefed on the prohibitions and
requirements of this General Order. Commanders and supervisors are
expected to implement monitoring programs to assist with enforcing this
order.
7. Effective Date: This General Order is effective immediately.
8. Expiration: This general order will remain in effect until rescinded,
waived, or modified.
9. Waiver Authority: Authority to waive or modify the prohibitions of
this order is delegated to the first Flag, General Officer, or SES in an
individual's chain of command or supervision. Any waiver or
modification must be documented in writing and indicate the specific
factors that justify the waiver or modification.
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